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The volume Kant and social policies, edited by A. 
Faggion, N. S. Madrid and A. Pinzani provides us 
with valuable analysis of Kant’s political and juris-
tic thought, as well as its relevance today.
The book contains seven closely connected articles. 
The first five texts deal from different perspectives 
with Kant’s claims about redistributive justice and 
human rights, and they are accompanied by two 
other texts that follow-up: Faviola Rivera Castro’s 
text about international law (Rawls and Kant on Com-
pliance with International Laws of Justice, 125–148) 
and Joel Thiago Klein’s text about the importance 
of public education (Kant and Public Education for 
Enhancing Moral Virtue: The Necessary Conditions 
for Ensuring Enlightened Patriotism, 149–174). The 
opening article Kant on Citizenship, Society and Re-
distributive Justice by Susan Meld Shell critically ex-
amines the most significant contemporary readings 
of Kant’s theory of distributive justice and provides 
an original interpretation, well supported by in-
telligent arguments and corresponding referenc-
es (1–24). In their text The State Looks down: Some 
Reassessments of Kant’s Appraisal of Citizenship Ales-
sandro Pinzani and Nuria Sánchez Madrid tried 
to point out some limitations of Kant’s distinction 
between active and passive citizenship (25–48). At 
the same time, they labeled Kant’s political thought 
as a mixture of liberalism and republicanism – but 
not reducible to either of them whose insights 
could be reappraised “in order to criticize certain 
dogmas that dominate our society” (p. 45). The Ar-
ticle Kant For and Against Human Rights by Agui-
naldo Pavão and Andrea Faggion compares Kant’s 
understanding of the only human right with The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and em-
phasizes their differences (49–64). Alberto Pirni 
tried to explain the foundations of rights and in-
tersubjectivity in Kant’s ethics (The Place of Social-
ity: Models of Intersubjectivity According to Kant, 65 
– 92). The text by Helga Verden critically exam-
ines Kant’s arguments about redistributive justice 
and the shortcomings of Rawls’s and Nozick’s in-
terpretations (Rawls vs Nozick vs Kant on Domestic 
Economic Justice, 93 – 124).
It may seem as if one of the main aims of this book 
is to give us some kind of final answer to the ques-
tion: in which category should Kant’s philosophy 
of politics be put? Namely, there is a long tradi-
tion of understanding Kant as a “minimalist” lib-
ertarian, in the works of thinkers such as Nozick 
and many others. On the other hand, more and 
more interpreters stress the “socio-democratic” 
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elements of Kant’s claims on redistributive jus-
tice. If this volume (intentionally) fails to point 
out a simple answer to the former question, it 
is only because it actually uncovers in detail the 
complexity of Kant’s view.
Kant’s claims about redistributive justice are ex-
amined in detail in four texts of this volume. The 
crucial passage which is placed by the authors in 
the center of attention, and which was also the 
main motivation to attribute to Kant’s political 
views some version of “state-welfarism”, is the 
introduction of taxation in Metaphysics of Morals:
To the supreme commander (Oberbefehlshaber) 
there belongs indirectly, that is, insofar as 
he has taken over the duty of the people, the 
right to impose taxes on the people for its 
own preservation, such as taxes to support 
organizations providing for the poor, foundling 
homes, and church organizations, usually called 
charitable or pious institutions. (AA 06:326)
What might seem as Kant’s obvious recognition of 
the state’s duty to care about the needs of individ-
uals is rather a much more complicated problem, 
worthy of the greatest attention. 1) It seems that 
Kant actually rejects the idea that justice can re-
quire the redistribution of resources in response 
to needs (Varden, 99; AA 27: 517, 526). More-
over, Kant explicitly rejects juridical relevance of 
material inequality (AA 08; 289–290) and “mere” 
needs and wishes (AA 06: 213,230, see Shell, 3–4). 
2) Libertarian readers, such as Nozick, go a step 
further and claim that such redistribution would 
always contradict a person’s right to private prop-
erty, and consequently a person’s freedom, which 
was the basis of Kant’s law theory. To avoid these 
problems some interpreters, such as Onora O’Neil, 
suggested that we should understand the former 
quote as the right of the state to enforce the duty 
of benevolence. However, as Shell and Varden ar-
gue here, O’Neils thesis fails to address chiefly the 
juridical duty, for it is more concerned with(mere) 
ethics (6), and also fails to give a coherent solu-
tion to Nozick’s problem of justice (100). 3) The 
quote itself, as it is shown in this volume, con-
tains several very complex problems: Kant actu-
ally isn’t addressing the rights of individuals (the 
satisfaction of their basic needs), but the right of 
the “supreme commander” related to the “duty of 
people” (Phlicht des Volks); it remains unclear what 
is the end of it, for Kant gave a complex explana-
tion about what he means under the expression 
“for its own preservation”. 
In order to clarify possible answers most of the 
articles refer to Kant’s distinction between active 
and passive citizenship. Although every citizen of 
the state should have a guaranteed lawful freedom 
and civil equality, not all of them have self-sub-
sistence (Selbständigkeit) or (economical) indepen-
dence for the will of someone other. Kant calls 
those who lack self-subsistence passive citizens, 
and with regard to this dependency, renounces 
their right to vote (AA 06: 314). 
Of course, many authors find this distinction prob-
lematic. It could be said that this account seems 
inconsistent with equal liberty, or with the initial 
independency of citizens (Shall, 2). Kant himself 
finds that the concept of passive citizenship actu-
ally contradicts the concept of the citizen of the 
state (AA 06: 314). However, he holds that there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with dependence if it 
arises from one’s own choice or natural incapaci-
ty, such as youth, etc. (Shall, 18) Kant’s only hope 
is “that anyone can work his way up from passive 
condition to an active” (AA 06: 315).
Alessandro Pinzani and Nuria Sánchez Madrid 
listed three key limitations of Kant’s account of 
passive citizenship. 1) They found Kant’s argu-
ment that the poor should not vote, because they 
would sell their votes, double-edged – for the same 
argument could be used against the rich (buyers), 
and it was used for ostracism in Ancient Athens. 
2) Kant addresses formal obstacles to attaining 
full active citizenship, while (intentionally or not) 
economic privileges and inequalities are left out of 
the consideration. 3) Kant is very insensible to the 
gender issue, for he finds that a woman renounces 
her civil independence by entering into marriage. 
However, Susan Meld Shell used this account to 
further her own argument. If we keep in mind 
that Kant is not focused on the status of inde-
pendency of every private person per se, but on 
a general condition, that nothing prevents pas-
sive citizens to “work their way up” to an active 
status, we could shed a new light on his views on 
redistributive justice. Therefore, as Shall argued, 
what interest Kant it is not the satisfaction of basic 
needs, nor material inequality, but rightful con-
ditions. Furthermore, this view is neither liber-
tarian, nor socio-democratic, but it could justify 
some important welfare policies, such as the right 
to education, health care, etc. 
 It is important to underline that Kant’s redistrib-
utive policies are not concerned for the individual 
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rights of persons. As A. Pavão and A. Faggion ar-
gued, Kant’s understanding of human rights is 
somewhat narrower, for it actually contains only 
one innate right- freedom, insofar as it can coexist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with 
a universal law (50). What libertarian critiques of 
redistributive policies oversee is that the mutual 
interdependence under the public rights of state 
(from which neither the rich are immune), more 
than the question of private rights, is that which 
could enforce redistribution (Shall, 21; Pinzani & 
Madrid, 36; Pavão & Faggion, 60; Varden, 106f). 
Articles in this book rightfully emphasize that 
Kant’s main concern is not the state’s own mate-
rial preservation, nor the preservation of its in-
dividual members, but the end of the redistribu-
tion, which has to be related to the “Rousseauan” 
conception of (a priori united) the general will of 
the people (Shall; Pinzani & Madrid; Pirni; Var-
den). Kant wrote:
The general will of the people has united it-
self into a society which is to maintain itself 
perpetually; and for this end it has submitted 
itself to the internal authority of the state in 
order to maintain those members of the so-
ciety who are unable to maintain themselves 
(AA 06: 326)
Shall made a complex argument concerning Kant’s 
distinction between civil union (juridical state) and 
society. Accordingly, the public society should be 
understood as “a creature of the state […] owning 
its existence to the self-constitutive juridical act 
by which the state itself is formed” (Shall, 8). The 
end and justification of redistribution have to be, 
thus, understood in terms of the ongoing existence 
of people as members of society:
As member of the general will, in other words, 
each wills his own existence as citizen only 
insofar as he also, and equally, wills the civic 
existence of every other member of the peo-
ple (Shall, 8)
Alberto Pirni made further arguments and tried to 
justify the a priori foundation of this intersubjec-
tivity through the ethical idea of the realm of ends.
Taking the former arguments in consideration, it 
becomes obvious that Kant’s requirements could 
not be reduced to merely negative conditions of 
individual independence, but rather that they ad-
vocate a positive task of a self-subsistence under 
the general will of the people, which was highly 
compatible with the ideals of the enlightenment. 
Therefore, the public education, which presup-
poses not mere learning but constant practicing 
of the public use of reason, becomes one of the 
crucial tasks of the state. Joel Thiago Klein dealt 
with this problem in his article.
Many more problems could arise if we raise this 
discussion to a higher level, concerning the issue 
of lawful interrelations between the states. In his 
article Faviola Rivera Castro analyses Kant view 
on international justice, by emphasizing, in con-
trast to Rawls, the contractarian solution and the 
importance of the relation between states, rather 
than the mere level of their development.
 The volume Kant and Social Policies represents 
indispensable literature for Kant scholars. At the 
same time, it provides very appealing and engaging 
insight in Kant’s thought for a broader audience. 
However, the most valuable benefit of this book 
is probably that it connects Kant’s relevant argu-
ments with contemporary concerns of our society.
